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by individual mutual fund investors. In 2004, the average actively managed fund expense ratio was
approximately 140 basis points, while the majority of index funds charge fees ranging from 10 basis points to
50 basis points. A expense ratio of 140 basis points would mean that $140 of every $10,000 invested by an
individual in a fund will go to the portfolio manager in order to compensate them for their research and
management. Some funds carry further expenses in the form of load charges. They take a percentage of an
investors initial investment as a sales commission, as these funds are distributed directly by the fund
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Efficiency of the Mutual Fund Industry:  
an Examination of U.S. Domestic 
Equity Funds:  1995-2004
By Chase Stewart
I. INTRODUCTION
 Investors have the ability to choose between two different management styles 
in the mutual fund industry.    These two management styles differ in both the 
investment strategy type the fund executes and management costs, which are 
charged to the funds’ investors.  First, investors may invest their funds in index 
funds, which employ a passive investment strategy.  Here, investors expect to 
earn a rate of return equivalent to the market index—minus a small management 
fee—which the fund seeks to track.  Alternatively, investors may choose active 
fund management.  The returns of these mutual funds rely on stock selection 
ability of portfolio managers.  Active portfolio managers perform securities 
research and obtain information in an attempt to distinguish between under-
valued and overvalued securities—allowing them to outperform the market.  To 
compensate for the cost of this research, these funds generally charge a higher 
management fee which is paid by individual mutual fund investors.  In 2004, the 
average actively managed fund expense ratio was approximately 140 basis points, 
while the majority of index funds charge fees ranging from 10 basis points to 50 
basis points.  A expense ratio of 140 basis points would mean that $140 of every 
$10,000 invested by an individual in a fund will go to the portfolio manager in 
order to compensate them for their research and management.  Some funds 
carry further expenses in the form of load charges.  They take a percentage of an 
investors initial investment as a sales commission, as these funds are distributed 
directly by the fund management company. Much debate within the investment 
community has revolved around the question of whether the fees charged by 
actively managed mutual funds are justified with higher returns.
  In a model where information is costly to obtain and use during the stock 
selection and market timing process, it is efficient for trades made by informed 
investors to compensate them for their research [Grossman and Stiglitz,1980]. 
Thus, it should be found that active mutual fund managers will provide investors 
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with returns higher than that of their index fund counterparts—offsetting the 
higher fees paid for their management.  And, in equilibrium, management fees 
will be exactly equal to the cost born by management to obtain trading infor-
mation.  This type of model can be contrasted with a situation in which stock 
information is free.  In this situation, Fama [1970] states that security prices will 
incorporate all available information.  Under this form of the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH), investors would be irrational to invest in active funds, as ef-
ficiency in the market would make it impossible for them to outperform passive 
index funds.  In effect, investors would be paying portfolio managers to gather 
information already imbedded in the market.
 It will be the main focus of this paper to test for market efficiency in the 
mutual fund industry under the conditions of costly information.  The paper will 
first begin with an overview of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the 
Sharpe Ratio and review relevant studies on mutual fund performance.  Next, the 
CAPM and the Sharpe Ratio will be estimated for the funds in our sample and 
compared to the overall market.  From this analysis, it will be evaluated whether 
active equity funds on average have had the ability to “beat the market” over the 
period 1995-2004.  This will be followed by a further analysis of industry cost 
efficiency—updating previous studies by testing the effect of management fees 
and load charges on fund returns with the most recently available data.  This 
analysis will be used to test for inefficiencies in our chosen model of market 
efficiency.  Last, the findings of this research will be summarized, and concluding 
statements regarding its implications for rational investors will be made.
II. PORTFOLIO THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
 The beginnings of modern portfolio theory came about in the early 1960s. 
The following section will review two models of portfolio returns that have been 
developed since that time.  In addition, relevant studies on portfolio returns will 
be examined.
A.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Sharpe Ratio
 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Sharpe [1964] 
and others over the course of the 1960s.  This model explains portfolio and 
security returns with the following equation:
  )()( RFRRRFRRE Mi −+= b
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Here, a portfolio’s or security’s expected return is equal to the return of the risk 
free rate (RFR) and its correlation with the return of the market (RM)—defined 
by its Beta.  The CAPM assumes that no other factors affect a portfolio’s expected 
return—thus the CAPM expects no abnormal return.  Typically, the CAPM in 
used in empirical research in the following form developed by Jensen [1968]:
  
The constant term is often referred to as “Jensen’s Alpha.”  Alpha is the measure 
of abnormal return in this form of the CAPM equation (again, expected to be 
zero).  Jensen [1968] found, using data on all mutual funds from 1945-1964, 
that the mean alpha of funds was negative—leading him to conclude that the 
majority of mutual funds could not on average “beat the market.”  However, Ip-
polito [1989] found contradicting evidence, as the mean alpha for funds in his 
study was positive—leading him to conclude that it was possible for a random 
selection of funds to outperform the market.  In addition, Ippolito [1989] used 
regression analysis to further support his findings, finding that expenses did not 
have a statistically significant relationship with fund returns.  Using the same 
time period and methodology, Elton et al. [1993] found contradictory findings 
to that of Ippolito when adding a proxy variable for non-S&P500 stocks into 
the model.
 The first section of this paper will update these previous studies with data 
on all domestic mutual funds (ex-specialty funds) over the ten year period 
1995-2004.  Both the CAPM equation and the Sharpe Ratio of risk-adjusted 
returns will be used to test whether active funds have the ability to outperform 
the market.  While very similar, Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe Ratio differ in 
their definition of risk.  The CAPM equation defines risk as volatility from the 
market portfolio—systematic risk. On the other hand, the Sharpe Ratio uses a 
portfolio’s standard deviation as its proxy for risk, which measures total risk. 
The Sharpe Ratio is defined by the equation:
  
The numerator is the average portfolio return in period t minus the average risk-
free rate of return over period t.  The denominator of the equation is the standard 
deviation of those returns—resulting in a composite measure of portfolio perfor-
mance indicating the risk premium earned per unit of total risk.  By comparing 
the Sharpe Ratio of a fund to that of the market portfolio, one can gauge the 
superiority or inferiority of that fund’s returns [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
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B.  The Role of Costs in Mutual Fund Performance
 Previous studies have found contradictory evidence in regards to the role 
of management fees on fund performance.  Early studies by Friend et al. [1970], 
Jensen [1968], and Sharpe [1966] all found that mutual funds do not earn rates of 
return high enough to offset their expenses.  More recently, Bogle [1998] found 
similar results by testing over a ten year period ending in 2001 and a five year 
period ending in 1997.  In our model of efficiency, these results would lead us 
to assume that the mutual fund industry is not in equilibrium.  Other studies, 
however, have found that funds do achieve returns that are sufficient enough 
to offset their costs.  As discussed above, the most notable of these studies was 
done by Ippolito [1989].  Like the work of Ippolito, the main focus of this paper 
will be to update previous studies and test for market efficiency in the mutual 
fund industry using CAPM methodology.  In addition, the Sharpe Ratio will 
be used to further examine the nature of returns and costs in the mutual fund 
industry.
III. ANALYSIS OF RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
A.  Sample Selection
 The sample used throughout this paper includes all U.S. domestic equity 
funds (ex-specialty funds).  All historical data was obtained from the Morn-
ingstar, Inc. Premium Mutual Fund Screener, which holds up to ten years of 
historical data for currently existing funds.  As with Jensen [1968], this sample 
suffers from survivorship bias, as only funds still existing currently are available 
to be selected in the sample.  To meet the sample selection criteria, a fund had 
to have ten years of available historical data. In addition, all index funds and 
institutional funds were removed from the sample.  Using the selection criteria, 
962 funds were included in the sample.  Information on returns, expense ratios, 
and load fees were all obtained from the Morningstar, Inc. Premium Mutual 
Fund Screener database.  Other variables used in this section and those that 
follow are derived or calculated from this data.
B.  Jensen’s Alpha, 1995-2004
 For each fund in the sample set, Jensen’s form of the CAPM equation was 
estimated:
 (1)                                                               ,  t = 1995-2004,ttMttt RFRRRFRR eba +−+=− )(
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where Rt is the rate of return for the fund in year t.  This return is net of all 
management fees except load charges.  The variable RFRt is the risk-free rate of 
return in year t, as measured by the return of U.S. Treasury Bills [Damodaran, 
2005].  The rate of return in year t of the market portfolio, defined here as the 
S&P 500, is denoted RMt [Damodaran, 2005].  Remember that the CAPM has an 
E[α] = 0; however, superior portfolio managers who have market timing ability 
or can consistently select undervalued securities will earn higher risk premiums 
than the CAPM predicts.  In terms of the regression, superior portfolio managers will 
have consistently positive random error terms—resulting in a positive constant 
term, or alpha.  Consistent inferior performance in turn would lead to a negative 
alpha [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
 Based on the 95 percent level of confidence, it was found that of the 962 
mutual funds analyzed, 905 were characterized by alphas statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, 12 by statistically significant positive alphas, and 45 by 
statistically significant negative alphas.  These results are summarized in TABLE 
I with the findings of Jensen [1968] and Ippolito [1989].  The mean alpha for the 
sample was -0.17 percent, indicating that the funds in the sample, on average, 
had inferior performance compared to the overall market.  These results were 
similar to those found by Jensen [1968].
TABLE I
Alphas for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
 
  Zeroa Positive Negative Total Mean   Mean 
      Alpha  Beta
Current Study, 1995-2004 905 12 45 962 -0.17 0.83
Ippolito, 1965-1984 127 12 4 143 0.81 0.88
Jensen, 1945-1964b 98 3 14 115 -1.1 0.84
      
a. Alphas are classified as zero if the absolute t-values of the estimated alpha coefficients are less than 2.306, which entails the 95% 
confidence interval, two-tail test
b. Fifty-six funds in the Jensen study were based on annual data from 1945-1964; the remaining results were based on annual data 
from 1955-1964 
FIGURE I
Current Study, 1995-2004 Ippolito, 1965-1984 Jensen, 1945-1964
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negative 5%
zero
94%
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negative 3%
zero
89%
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C.  Sharpe Ratio, 1995-2004
 Similar to the section above, a Sharpe Ratio was calculated for each of the 
962 funds in the sample.  The Geometric Sharpe Ratio, denoted in the following 
equation, was used:
 (2)        ,  t = ten year period ending Dec. 31, 2004,
where 1985<t is the compound annual growth rate (CAGR), or geometric rate of 
return, for each mutual fund from 1995-2004; and  tRFR  is the CAGR for U.S. 
treasury bills over the same period.  The variable σ
t
 is the geometric standard 
deviation of fund returns over the ten year period.  The results on this analysis 
are found in Table II.
 The Sharpe Ratio for the market (S&P 500 index), is approximately 0.21. 
Under portfolio theory, this figure represents the risk-adjusted return falling on 
the Capital Market Line [Reilly and Brown, 2003].  Thus, a fund with a higher 
Sharpe Ratio would have earned a risk-adjusted return in excess  of the market.  
 For the 962 funds, only 384 were able to earn returns above the Capital 
Market Line.  This represents approximately 40 percent of the mutual funds in 
the sample.  The mean Sharpe Ratio was 0.17654, approximately 0.035 below 
the return obtained by the S&P 500 market index.  This result is similar to that 
found using Jensen’s alpha—revealing that the funds in the sample failed to “beat 
the market” on risk-adjusted terms. 
TABLE II
Sharpe Ratio for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
  Sharpe 
  Ratio of  Funds Funds   Mean   
  S&P 500 Outperforming  Underperforming Total Sharpe Ratio 
Current Study, 1995-2004 0.2109878 384 578 962 0.17654 
IV. Cost Efficiency of U.S. Domestic Equity Mutual Funds
A.  Model of Mutual Fund Cost Efficiency
 In the model of efficiency tested in this paper, costs play the central role. 
Under forms of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) where security prices 
reflect all available information, there is no possible way for informed (active) 
portfolio managers to outperform the market.  Thus, investors placing their 
savings in actively managed mutual funds are playing a loser’s game, as they are 
t
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paying fees to reimburse mutual fund managers for collecting and trading on 
information that is already reflected in market prices.  Ippolito [1989] asserts 
that this type of market equilibrium is flawed.  If information is costly to obtain 
and implement, then equilibrium, in which securities reflect all information, 
makes it impossible for the market to compensate for information-gathering 
activities.  Thus, if the mutual fund industry is occupied by rational investors, 
active funds would eventually cease to exist as investors would recognize this 
impossibility.  
 Instead of assuming that the existence of active funds is irrational, we assume a 
different model of efficiency in the mutual fund industry which is used by Ippolito 
[1989].  In this model, Ippolito [1989] supposes that there are a certain number 
of informed traders that are able to generate a wedge between trade prices and 
full-information prices by gathering information.  In equilibrium, passive inves-
tors essentially pay informed traders a sufficient amount to compensate for the 
market arbitrage function [Grossman, 1976].  Thus, informed traders “beat the 
market” before expenses, but make no excess returns after netting out the costs 
borne during the information-gathering activity (if this were not the case and 
informed traders “beat the market” after netting out expenses, it would pay for 
more investors to become informed).  So, in equilibrium, there is no incentive to 
favor an actively managed fund or a passively managed index fund.
 To test this model of efficiency, OLS methodology will be used to examine 
whether expense ratios and load fees have any impact on the risk-adjusted rate 
of return earned by all funds in the sample.  
 
B.  Specification
 As with our earlier analysis, both Jensen’s CAPM equation and the Geometric 
Sharpe Ratio will be used.  For the CAPM, the following OLS equations will be used:
(3)  ttiiitMtitt fYeMFdLcERFRRbRFRR eb +++++−=− )( , t = 1995-2004
where βi is the fund beta estimated from equation one.  Thus, coefficient of this 
variable should be statistically insignificant from one.  The variable Ei denotes 
the fund’s expense ratio as of Dec 31, 2004; and Li is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a mutual fund charges a load fee.  
 It should be noted that this regression uses panel data derived from our 
original sample.  Thus, each fund has ten observations, one for each year of 
the sample period. The variables MFi and Yt are vectors of mutual fund and 
year dummies.  These vectors are used to account for correlations between the 
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residual across funds and years [Ippolito, 1989].  Due to constraints of our esti-
mation capabilities of our available statistical software, the sample size had to be 
reduced.  A random sampling of 750 funds was selected from the original 962. 
It is assumed that this sampling has little to no effect on the empirical results of 
the regression analysis.
 Similar regressions are run using the Geometric Sharpe Ratio.  The return 
measure used in the equation is the ratio of the fund minus that of the S&P 500 
index:
(4) tiitPSt cLbEaSRSR e+++=− ,500&  , t = 1995-2004
The entire sample of 962 funds was used for this regression.  The results of both 
regressions are shown in TABLE III and TABLE IV.
D.  Empirical Results of Cost Efficiency
 The results from the OLS regressions indicate that mutual funds are not 
cost efficient as the theoretical model suggests.  For cost efficiency to hold, one 
would expect the coefficients on the expense ratio variable in the regressions 
to be insignificant from zero; however, this only held true using equation 5.  In 
all other instances, there was a strong negative relationship between a fund’s 
expense ratio and its return.  The estimated coefficients on the expense variable 
suggest that for each unit increase in Ei, the fund’s return decreased anywhere 
from 0.86 to 2.5 percent from its expected value in the CAPM.
TABLE III
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance [Rt-RFRt], 1995-2004
                        Variable Mean (3)   
βt[RMt-RFRt] 8.159 1.00  
  (41.03)  
Expense Ratio 1.420 -1.65  
  (-4.08)  
Loada 0.405 10.33  
  (2.40)  
Mutual fund and year dummy variablesb X X  
R2  0.73  
Observations  7500  
a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges
b. Includes a dummy variable for each mutual fund and one for each year
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 It is unclear whether those funds charging loads earn returns sufficient to 
offset the additional fee charged to investors.  By law, a mutual fund may charge 
up to an 8.50 percent load charge [Ippolito, 1989].  The results obtained by 
equation 3 indicate that such a fee would be offset typically within one to five 
years of the purchase of the fund.  On the other hand, the results obtained by 
equation 4 indicate that funds charging a load fee do not earn returns higher or 
lower than no-load funds.
TABLE IV
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance 
[Sharpefund-SharpeS&P500], 1995-2004
Variable Mean (4)   
Expense Ratio 1.431 -0.15  
  (16.35)  
Loada 0.395 -0.018  
  (0.49)  
Constant X 0.19  
  (1.25)  
R2  0.22  
Observations  962   
a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges
V. CONCLUSION
 This paper examined cost efficiency in mutual fund industry using a model 
in which it is costly for portfolio managers obtain information about securities. 
The data and methodology are similar to that of several papers ranging in time 
from the 1960s to the 1990s, most notably that of Ippolito [1989] and Jensen 
[1968].  The CAPM and Sharpe Ratio were used to analyze the risk-adjusted 
returns of 962 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds over the period 1995-2004.
 It was found that actively managed funds failed to meet their objective 
and outperform the market, defined by this study as the S&P 500 index, on a 
risk-adjusted basis.  The overall mean alpha for the mutual fund industry was 
-0.17, with 45 funds characterized by statistically significant negative alphas, 
and only 12 funds with statistically significant positive alphas.  In addition, 
only 40 percent of funds in the sample were found to outperform the Capital 
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Market Line over the ten year period when using the Sharpe Ratio as a proxy 
of risk-adjusted returns.  The results found using the CAPM were similar to 
that of Jensen [1968], but contradictory to those found by Ippolito [1968].  The 
presence of such contradictory results should lead to future research to find 
why the industry alpha in the mutual fund industry changes over time or differs 
depending on the sample period.  
 Following the methodology of Ippolito [1989], OLS regression analysis was 
also used to assess cost efficiency in the mutual fund industry.  In the equilibrium 
of the model tested, portfolio managers were assumed to be able to outperform 
the market by an amount exactly equal to the cost required to obtain and use the 
information which they used to trade—thus, investors earn the same return in 
index funds and active funds.  Results, using OLS methodology, did not support 
evidence that the mutual fund industry was in equilibrium during the sample 
period, or even perhaps that such a model governs the mutual fund industry.  It 
was found that funds with higher expense ratios, on average, earned lower rates 
of return after expenses.  Thus, these funds did not earn rates of return that were 
sufficient to offset the higher management fees they charge investors.  From the 
analysis presented in this paper, it is unclear whether funds charging load fees 
did earn rates of return that were sufficient to offset their sales charges.  The 
regression based off of the CAPM showed that a load charge would be offset 
by higher returns within a one to five year period on average.  However, the 
regression using the Sharpe Ratio indicated that load funds earn returns that 
are insignificantly different from no-load funds.  
 These results suggest that rational investors should take expense ratios into 
account when making mutual fund investment decisions, and might consider 
cheap passive portfolio management as a superior option to that of active fund 
management.  Although, it should be reiterated that the results presented in this 
paper are in alignment with some past studies, while contradictory to others. 
This suggests that studies on mutual fund efficiency may be dependent on both 
the methodology and, more importantly, the time periods used in the study. 
Future research using multiple long-term time periods might shed more light 
on the effects of costs on mutual fund returns.
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Appendix A: DATA DEFINITIONS
Listed below are the data definitions of all fund variables obtained from the 
Morningstar Premium Fund Screener database:
Expense Ratio
 The expense ratio of a mutual fund expresses the percentage of assets de-
ducted each fiscal year for fund expenses.  These expenses include 12b-1 fees, 
management fees, administrative fees, operating costs, and all other asset-based 
cost incurred by the fund.  The expense ratios used in this analysis are those 
reported as of December 31st of 2004 by each fund.  It should be noted that 
these expense ratios for trailing returns-as year by year expense ratio data was 
not available.  Therefore, it is an implicit assumption of this analysis that the 
expenses of these equity funds have either all stayed the same for the past five 
years or have all changed up or down by the same proportion over the various 
time periods.  
Fund Returns
 Annual total returns are calculated on a calendar-year basis.  This return 
includes both income, given in the forms of dividends, and capital gains or losses. 
Morningstar, Inc. calculates total return by taking the change in the fund’s NAV, 
assuming reinvestment of all income and capital gains distributions during the 
period, and then dividing by the initial NAV.  These returns are adjusted for 
expenses included in a funds expense ratio.  
No-Load Funds
No load funds are sold to do-it-yourself investors and thus carry no sales charge. 
Because of the variety and complexity of possible sales charges and marketing 
fees, it is difficult to create hard and fast rules that separate load and no-load 
funds.  Morningstar currently defines no-load funds as those offerings that 
have no front-end or deferred load, and a 12b-1 fee less than or equal to 0.25% 
per year.
 
Other Data Issues-Survivorship Bias
Like many other studies dealing with mutual funds, this analysis must deal 
with fund survivorship.  For this study, only funds which still exist today will be 
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included-as data for funds that have closed were not available.  This issue also 
creates another issue for analyzing past returns of funds.  Since poor perform-
ers tend to drop out while strong performers continue to operate, this cause an 
overestimation of past returns.  This is known as survivorship bias.  Assuming 
that more active funds drop out over time (as poor performance is usually defined 
by trailing a benchmark/index), it may be appropriate to keep in mind that the 
overall average returns for active funds is overstated in this study.  For example, 
the Wall Street Journal reported in 1997 that during the time period 1982-1992 
mutual funds reported average returns of 18.1%.  When survivorship bias was 
taken into account, average fund returns were taken down to 16.3%.
q
